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CHINA' s GREENTECH PROGRAMS AND THE 
USTR INVESTIGATION* 
by Joel B. Eisen** 
INTRODUCTION 
S ince the Renewable Energy Law went into effect in 2006, the Chinese gove~ment has implemented numerous laws and programs designed to encourage renewables. 1 While 
China has made strong progress, many factors will influence the 
nation's future success in renewable energy deployment, includ-
ing the need for consistent pricing policies to stimulate private 
sector development and the need to upgrade the country's trans-
mission grid.2 
The issue of China's support for renewables has taken cen-
ter stage in a United States Trade Representative ("USTR") 
complaint alleging that China unfairly subsidizes its greentech 
industries, in violation of its obligations as a member of the 
World Trade Organization ("WT0"). 3 Well before that inves-
tigation began, numerous Americans believed the United States 
was less engaged in greentech promotion than China,4 and many 
feel the United States is falling behind. New York Times col-
umnist Thomas L. Friedman has been perhaps the most active 
proponent of this view, 5 but he has plenty of company. If recent 
reports are to be believed, China could be generating more elec-
tricity from renewables in 2020 than any other nation on Earth. 
It has also advanced rapidly in private sector spending on renew-
able energy technology and research and development spending. 
Many observers state that the two nations are engaged in 
a new "green energy race."6 This term deliberately invokes the 
"space race" competition between the U.S.S.R. and the United 
States to achieve milestones in space after the 1957 launch of the 
Sputnik satellite. To simplify matters a bit, there are two related 
but different arguments being made. The first is that China will 
dominate the global market for greentech, diminishing Ameri-
can companies' ability to compete with Chinese firms. This, of 
course, is the bedrock principle of the USTR investigation, and 
must be considered in the context of the complex relationship 
between the two nations. The United States has departed from 
its "courtship" of China, criticizing it for its currency stance and 
other economic policies. 7 
To some, "losing" the race and falling behind the Chinese 
would have serious consequences for national supremacy. Even 
senior military leaders recognize that the United States is jeop-
ardizing its future by not taking appropriate steps to address the 
dire situation presented by climate change. In this view, failing 
to transition to a clean energy economy would leave the United 
States vulnerable to ceding its position as a major world power. 
Playing into fears about China provided a convenient means 
of political theater in the 20 IO election season, 8 but portraying 
China's ascendancy in greentech as a national threat will have 
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unacceptable costs. Given our nations' pressing needs to address 
climate change, it would be much more productive to forego the 
rhetoric of the greentech war and support both nations' green-
tech initiatives. Moreover, the reasons given for why China is 
"winning" the "race" are not yet completely convincing. 
Invoking a race metaphor may be less productive than cap-
turing national attention in the United States with concrete, clear 
domestic goals. I believe that the United States should articulate a 
single, clear national goal, just as it did with space research in the 
Cold War era. Elsewhere, I have argued for the creation of"solar 
utilities"9 that would deliver greentech in the residential setting 
by consolidating all of the functions of financing, installing, and 
servicing in single entities that would ramp up to utility-size scale 
in individual areas. This is the sort of idea that could capture the 
popular imagination and lead to more greentech development in 
the United States than casting China as a competitor. 
GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION IN GREENTECH?: 
SUITABILITY OF THE "SPACE RAcE" METAPHOR 
The idea that the United States and China are in a compe-
tition for greentech supremacy has many adherents. A recent 
Internet search for "China" and "green energy race" yielded 
over 300,000 results, with most of the top one hundred having 
titles such as "Who's Winning the Clean Energy Race?,'' 10 "Is 
China Beating the U.S. in Green Technology Development?,"11 
and so forth. The "China as green competitor" narrative has 
captivated journalists, 12 bloggers, 13 politicians, 14 environmen-
talists, 15 think tanks, 16 executives of venture capital and energy 
companies,17 financial market analysts and commentators, 18 and 
many others. The USTR investigation is yet another measure of 
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the strength of the race idea. Some say the race is already over. 
One observer notes, "[t]he United States ceded its leadership 
in the production of clean energy technologies during the past 
decade of neglect." 19 
WHAT Is THE "RACE," AND Is CHINA "WINNING"? 
In the space race, there were concrete goals in physical 
space: put satellites and humans in orbit, and land a man on 
the moon. Here, it is not so clear. What is the competition with 
China'? To have more solar panels and wind turbines in place? 
More governmental and private investment in greentech? More 
greentech-friendly governmental policies? All of the above? 
Those writing about it often have different agendas. Companies 
want more investment in greentech and more access to China's 
markets. Environmentalists want more active federal policies to 
encourage deployment ofrenewables. Free traders want barriers 
to trade removed. 
Consider a threshold question: Why are we competing with 
China? European nations20 have had greentech policies for many 
years, have seen strong growth in greentech, and have generated 
much electricity from renewables.21 Some observers note that 
the race is not with one nation but many,22 yet the prevailing 
comparison is to China. There is something more to the "race" 
metaphor, then, than growth in greentech. As in the space race, 
there is the pervasive sense that if China has more extensive 
greentech investments and deployment than we do, there will be 
drastic consequences for national power and wealth. Denmark 
and Germany attract less attention than China because they pose 
less of a threat to the United States' superpower status.23 
Evaluating the "race" claims on their merits, it is hardly 
clear that the United States is "losing" to China. The differences 
between the two nations are much more subtle than they appear 
in the prevailing narrative.24 
Growth of China's Greentech Industry 
One fear is that multinational companies will find it dif-
ficult to sell their greentech in China, and Chinese companies 
will flood the United States with their products. This fear reflects 
broader American unease about China's potential for global eco-
nomic dominance. In 1979, China began to experiment with the 
free market, and since then, has experienced robust growth.25 In 
2010, China's economy had become the world's second largest, 
surpassing Japan's.26 China's "pace of industrialization is signifi-
cantly faster than that experienced by other countries throughout 
history."27 So much of China's manufacturing output is already 
sold in the United States that observers believe we are "joined at 
the hip economically."28 Many believe domestic products can-
not compete against those manufactured in China due to China's 
advantages in less expensive labor, more lax protections of intel-
lectual property, fixed currency rates (until very recently), and 
weaker environmental protections.29 In the depths of a recession 
in the United States, descriptions of growing Chinese greentech 
firms invoke images of a rising Asian industrial juggernaut. 
Is greentech destined to be another area in which the Chi-
nese overpower American firms? China's 2007 "Medium and 
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China" 
WINTER 2011 
contained an explicit goal to develop a domestic renewables sec-
tor. 30 China's wind turbine industry rose from virtual nonexis-
tence to become a major player in the global market in less than 
five years. In 2009, three of the largest wind turbine manufac-
turers in the world were Chinese.31 China leads the world mar-
ket for solar photovoltaics ("PV") cells and modules, producing 
more than forty percent.32 Chinese firms' share of the domestic 
market has increased rapidly,33 and Chinese companies have 
become major players around the globe. 34 
The USTR petition details a growing imbalance in "envi-
ronmental goods" between the United States and China,35 but 
in some categories, Chinese firms have been less successful in 
the United States. Chinese firms sold only 28 megawatt ("MW") 
worth of wind turbines outside of China in 2009.36 Some predict 
an upswing in Chinese greentech exports to the United States,37 
and at least one high-profile proposed project involving Chinese 
technology has attracted negative attention.38 
Another factor cited in the USTR investigation is that the 
Chinese government appears to be shutting foreign manufactur-
ers out of its domestic market. 39 Official Chinese government 
policy promotes "indigenous innovation," calling for reliance 
on foreign technology to decrease to thirty percent or less.40 
Foreign observers report that it has become more difficult for 
foreign companies to get their technology accepted in domes-
tic projects.41 A recent report states that thirty-six government 
regulations promote domestic greentech and hamper foreign 
firms' ability to compete in China.42 The USTR investigation 
petition claims, for example, that the indigenous innovation pol-
icy gives Chinese firms a five to ten percent advantage in wind 
turbine procurement processes.43 Encouraging announcements 
of joint ventures and other developments seem to contradict 
this protectionist trend.44 China has dropped a requirement that 
seventy percent of the components in wind turbines come from 
domestic sources.45 Agreements between American companies 
such as First Solar46 and Chinese local governments to develop 
renewable energy projects point to a potentially large market for 
American greentech in China.47 Perhaps ironically, however, 
the USTR investigation complaint cites the First Solar memo-
randum of understanding to develop a 2 gigawatt ("GW") solar 
project as impermissible under the WTO because First Solar 
agreed to work to support China's domestic industries.48 
The concern seems to be that Chinese firms will dominate 
the global greentech market if current growth rates continue. 
However, some signs in the past year point to overbuilding and 
overcapacity in the wind industry, and a possible retrenchment 
and consolidation. In mid-2010, concern about the failure to 
agree on a climate change agreement and projections of slowing 
demand in China for wind energy made for an uncertain busi-
ness climate for wind energy companies.49 The top three IPOs 
in 20 l 0 in global greentech were by Chinese companies.50 Other 
firms moved forward with their offerings,51 but a planned initial 
public offering for one firm had to be scrapped in mid-2010 due 
to unfavorable market conditions.52 
There is also evidence that Chinese firms are not yet com-
petitive in certain market segments. Some provincial utilities 
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have chosen Western wind turbines due to superior control sys-
tems and longer experience with manufacturing larger turbine 
sizes.53 As recently as 2009, Chinese wind turbines were less 
capable than their foreign counterparts, 54 as measured by lower 
capacity factors (the percentage of time that turbines operate to 
generate electricity). 55 
Chinese firms often do not hold key technology patents that 
would enable them to develop more sophisticated equipment.56 
Firms have grown rapidly through acquiring manufacturing 
equipment and capitalizing on advantages such as their lower 
cost of labor.57 As a result, they have a leadership position in 
"downstream" areas of the PV production chain, but lag behind 
in "upstream" areas requiring more technological skill, such as 
silicon purification, ingot, and wafer manufacturing.58 In 2009, 
American companies held the top ten cited patents worldwide in 
solar technology.59 
Many familiar with China believe that it is only a matter 
of time before Chinese greentech improves through importing 
foreign technology and assimilating it. Even if Chinese solar 
and wind technology improves, however, the greentech industry 
in the United States is growing.60 The cost advantages of Chi-
nese firms may eventually fade,61 or the gap may close. Chinese 
workers increasingly are demanding higher wages and better 
working conditions.62 Some greentech, like larger components 
of wind turbines, is heavy and expensive to transport.63 In the 
American market, the costs of shipping large turbines from 
China might outweigh higher domestic labor costs. And Ameri-
can greentech firms enjoy other cost advantages, such as prefer-
ential tax policies.64 
On the whole, then, Chinese firms are not yet invincible jug-
gernauts displacing their foreign counterparts. There is obvious 
concern, as the USTR investigation and high-level discussions 
and trade missions suggest. 65 Some retort that fear of Chinese 
firms is as overblown as rhetoric in the 1980s claiming that mighty 
Japan was about to dominate the world economic scene.66 Setting 
up China as an economic bogeyman has a potential drawback: it 
could imperil the bumpy economic relationship between the two 
nations. Some have argued that for this reason alone, it would be 
best to drop the rhetoric about a green energy race.67 
Central Government Support 
Observers believe China's national government offers con-
sistent and committed support to the greentech sector. In this 
view, a Communist nation with a central government planning 
process can develop renewables far more quickly. 68 However, 
the reality is that China occasionally struggles to find consis-
tency in its greentech policies. Some have led to considerable 
progress,69 such as the Renewable Energy Law and the 2009 
stimulus package,70 but others, including reorganizations of the 
governmental energy bureaucracy, have been less successful.71 
The most frequently cited instance of government support 
is direct financial aid, in the form of low-interest loans, export 
promotion, and other aid such as subsidized land made avail-
able to developers.72 The USTR complaint cites "prohibited 
subsidies to green technology"73 that include the Ministry of 
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Finance's "Special Fund for Wind Manufacturing," the Min-
istry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce's "Export Product 
Research and Development Fund," and the provision of financ-
ing through export credits by China's Export-Import Bank. 74 
The state-owned China Development Bank made $42 billion in 
loans in 20 I 0 to solar and wind energy companies, 75 a sum that 
exceeds comparable financing levels in the United States.76 
Yet some other policies, such as pricing for electricity gener-
ated from renewables added to the national electricity grid, have 
been anything but consistently encouraging. Over the past two 
years, prices in China's feed-in tariff for solar have been incon-
sistent.77 A project priced in late summer 2010 involved a feed-in 
tariff of 0. 73 renminbi (RMB, $0. I 08 at 6.8 RMB to the dollar) 
per kilowatt-hour.78 This was more than one-third less than a 
previous project's winning bid, which suggests the winning bid-
der may have been a state-owned enterprise ("SOE") that could 
undercut a private company's bid. This hybrid system of state-
owned and private companies competing for the same projects is 
cited in the USTR complaint as disfavoring competition.79 It is an 
ongoing challenge to China's energy system,80 and as one report 
observes, "lack of competition reduces efficiencies and innova-
tion that come from open and competitive markets."81 
Until 2009, a bidding tender system was also in place for 
electricity generated from wind turbines above 50 MW. That 
system was criticized for failing to promote wind power devel-
opment. 82 For smaller wind installations, provincial govern-
ments set pricing policies on a project specific basis, which 
provided little long-run guidance on pricing. A new system of 
"zonal tariffs" largely replaced the previous pricing scheme, but 
it is too early to tell whether it will encourage more wind power 
development. 
No fewer than nineteen governmental bodies have respon-
sibility for some aspect of greentech policy.83 There are inevi-
table delays in coordination. Ambitious announcements are 
not always translated quickly into concrete policies. 84 National 
proclamations tend to be broad frameworks requiring imple-
mentation by administrative organs of the national government. 
Unlike the American system, where public involvement can help 
steer actions of administrative agencies, the Chinese govern-
ment has little accountability to accomplish its advertised objec-
tives. 85 Key personnel changes in the inner circle of the Chinese 
Communist Party can make for policy reversals or alterations. 
The Chinese government's top-down nature creates enor-
mous reliance on provincial and local governments to imple-
ment national policies. Robust policy announcements by Beijing 
do not easily translate to the provinces,86 and coordination 
between national and local officials is difficuit.87 Local officials 
often have incentives to prefer projects that can deliver short-
term profits,88 not renewable energy projects that might not pan 
out for years. 89 Some local governments have direct conflicts of 
interest between responsibilities to promote SOEs and mandates 
to implement national policies.'10 
The perception that China's government is unwaveringly 
committed to supporting greentech is often accepted uncriti-
cally, without these or any other caveats. Observers often jump 
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to conclusions that might be erroneous or oversimplified. It is 
difficult to obtain accurate information from China's national 
government, which is secretive and prone to releases of propa-
ganda (as any reader of Xinhua knows).91 Information routinely 
available in the West is often protected in China as state secrets, 
and recent efforts to promote a freedom of information regime92 
show how difficult it is to understand governmental actions.93 
According to the USTR petition, "there is a lack of official, 
detailed information regarding the terms upon which financing 
is provided by China Exim Bank."94 Thus, sweeping pronounce-
ments about the Chinese government's intentions and policies 
should be avoided when possible. 
The Results Speak for Themselves ... Or Do They? 
By some metrics, Chinese greentech progress is impressive. 
In 2009, China obtained a larger share of electricity from renew-
able sources than the United States (17% versus 8.8%),95 but 
this figure is skewed by the predominance of hydroelectric gen-
eration in China,96 especially the mammoth Three Gorges Dam 
project.97 China added 13.8 GW of new wind power capacity to 
IO.O GW for the United States in 2009,98 but its installed total 
capacity still trailed that of the United States (35.l GW versus 
25.8 GW). Those numbers cannot be compared directly, as Chi-
na's wind projects have been less efficient.99 In 2009, China had 
a mere 0.4 GW of grid-connected solar PY capacity, 100 though 
it pledged to meet a much higher target by 2020. 101 The United 
States had a larger I .2 GW of installed PY capacity, still far less 
than world leader Germany's 9.8 GW. 102 
At present, then, China is not outstripping the United States 
in total installed capacity, but it might if it achieves its ambi-
tious targets for 2020-30 GW for wind (or possibly 100 GW, 
according to recent reports) and 1.8 GW for solar PY (or pos-
sibly as much as an astounding 20 GW). 103 However, much of 
the increase will be in hydropower. 104 And apples should be 
compared to apples: Europe and the United States also plan to 
increase installed capacity substantially above current levels by 
2020. 105 
Some point to a different metric. Asset financing levels 
in China have recently outpaced those of American firms. 106 
According to a recent report, 107 in 2009, Chinese spending 
(excluding R&D) totaled $34.6 billion to $18.6 billion for the 
United States. 108 As the spending levels are within the same 
order of magnitude, it does not seem that this is reason for panic. 
The real fear seems to be that if the United States does not adopt 
progressive climate measures (including a cap-and-trade law), 
it will fall further behind China. 109 The market data seems to 
capture the spirit of American inaction on renewables, but does 
it matter, except for international bragging rights, whether the 
United States or China occupies the top spot in solar and wind 
investment or installed capacity? 
Total investment figures or gigawatts of renewable energy 
capacity installed do not tell us how China is moving toward 
reducing its usage of fossil fuels and achieving climate goals. 
China is adding renewable energy capacity rapidly, but is much 
more dependent on conventional fossil fuel generation than the 
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United States. Coal accounts for a staggering seventy percent 
of the nation's electricity generation capacity. 110 Even large 
deployment of renewables will not enable China to reduce that 
number substantially over the next decade. 111 And that only tells 
part of the story. China's growth and increasing appetite of its 
citizens for modem conveniences has resulted in rapid increases 
in energy demand. 112 In 2010, China achieved the dubious mile-
stone of surpassing the United States as the world's largest pri-
mary energy user. 113 Its industries are far less energy-efficient 
than those in the United States and Japan. 114 The government's 
initiatives have helped, 115 but China still has a long way to go. 
To satisfy its increasing energy demand, China has added 
more conventional generation capacity than greentech. 116 An 
article on China and greentech stated that, "China's investment 
in renewable energy and other green technologies is miniscule 
compared to the resources devoted to its continued building of 
coal-fired power plants and efforts to secure dirty oil shale sup-
plies in Canada and elsewhere."117 In 2009, China began con-
struction of a mammoth 13.6 GW power base fueled by coal in 
Gansu province, the same location planned for a much-praised 
10 GW wind farm. 118 New investments in conventional tech-
nology made up over one-third of the 134.4 billion RMB (just 
under twenty billion dollars) in the first half of 2010. 119 As of 
20 I 0, China "uses more coal than the United States, Europe, and 
Japan combined."120 That context should be a central part of any 
discussion that touts China's achievements in deploying solar 
panels and wind turbines or in greentech financing levels. 
INVOKING THE SPACE RACE METAPHOR IS COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE 
While many believe the United States is losing the green 
energy race, the reality does not yet match the rhetoric. 121 
However, there is more at stake. We need to confront a power-
ful reality: the United States and China are interdependent, not 
independent competitors. 122 We need China to take the very 
actions some posit as competition. This makes the USTR inves-
tigation especially unwelcome. 123 Without its greentech efforts 
and other measures124 such as its announced goal to reduce the 
"carbon intensity" of its economy (C02 emissions per unit of 
GDP), 125 China's increasing energy demand and spending on 
conventional technology would add considerably to greenhouse 
gas emissions. 126 
There will be no effective global reduction of emissions 
that does not include the United States and China, 127 because 
they are by far the world's two largest emitters of green-
house gases. 128 Failure by either nation to reduce its emissions 
would imperil the entire global effort. 129 We should encourage 
and support China's efforts, not consider them a threat to our 
national wellbeing. 130 Rather than creating the scorched earth 
of a "greentech war,"131 both nations can benefit from collabo-
ration.132 The urgency to do this is compelling. No nation has 
ever had to address such daunting environmental challenges 
at the same time as it has pursued such rapid growth. 133 This 
poses major hurdles to tackling climate change that must be sur-
mounted by nations working together. And there are not just two 
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nations involved, but the whole world. 134 Rather than creating a 
two-nation race, we should encourage China's domestic policies 
and the climate change collaborations of the "BRIC" developing 
economies (Brazil, Russia, and India, in addition to China). 135 
Nationalistic rhetoric on climate change would be espe-
cially unfortunate for the U.S.-China relationship on climate 
matters. The two nations have ongoing tensions on a whole 
host of sensitive topics, 136 but have worked productively with 
each other to address climate change. 137 In the two-year period 
of international negotiations between the promulgation of the 
Bali Action Plan and the December 2009 Copenhagen summit, 
talks took place under the auspices of the U.S.-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue. 138 Discussions also took place during 
2009 with world leaders at the Pittsburgh G-20 summit 139 and 
at the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. 140 The 
two nations have pledged several times to take mutual action 
to address climate change, 141 and while the promises are often 
hortatory, the ongoing discussion does have important value 
in strengthening the bilateral relationship. 142 Advocating com-
petition with the Chinese undercuts these activities. Continued 
antagonistic rhetoric about a clean energy race will also make 
it difficult to conduct cooperative efforts in energy and environ-
mental matters. Unlike the near-complete scientific secrecy that 
marked the Cold War era, 143 China and the United States are 
working to develop technology together. 
Some even argue that China's programs to promote renew-
ables can be good for the United States' economy. 144 The Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations' Michael Levi, argues that "it's quite 
possible for the United States and China both to win, with China 
lowering the cost ofrelatively low-tech parts of the value chain, 
in tum growing the market for the higher-tech parts that are still 
handled by the United States."145 Levi compares this to other 
situations in which China manufactures products developed in 
the United States. 
Finally, greentech warring makes it more difficult to reach a 
global climate agreement. According to some accounts, China's 
foot-dragging 146 and refusal to adopt binding reduction targets 
was in part responsible for the failure of the Copenhagen Accord 
to incorporate global binding limits. 147 As China's economy 
continues its rapid growth, there will be even greater demand for 
it to agree to limit emissions. 148 Castigating it for its greentech 
policies could foster a climate of distrust and delay further prog-
ress on a post-Kyoto agreement. 
For all of these reasons, the symbolism of the space race is 
simply not helpful in a discussion of global climate change. 
Lessons for Energy Policy From the "Space Race" 
Blaming China deflects attention from our own inabili-
ties to develop progressive policies on renewables and climate 
change. Numerous observers have noted that we lack a stable set 
of policies to encourage greentech research, development, and 
deployment. 149 While we have done well to invent new tech-
nologies, 150 our efforts to advance them to the commercial stage 
and promote their deployment are "fragmented," spread among 
numerous agencies, and lacking coordination. 151 As many have 
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noted, "[g]overnment policies can provide a strong impetus for 
constructing renewable generation facilities," and there is a wide 
variety of potential incentives, including support for research and 
development, tax incentives, government procurement policies, 
renewable portfolio standards ("RPSs"), carbon cap-and-trade 
programs, and feed-in tariffs. 152 Federal spending on renew-
able energy is both anemic in its overall Ievels153 and, even after 
the added billions of dollars in the 2009 stimulus package, 154 
well behind that devoted to fossil fuels. 155 Federal tax policy for 
renewables is inconsistently supportive, 156 and in some years, 
many new projects come to fruition, but the pipeline often dries 
up. 157 The cyclical pace of support "clearly illustrates the conse-
quences of on-again, off-again short-term federal incentives for 
wind as a market signal."158 
Some Obama administration actions are similar to actions 
taken in response to Sputnik, such as the creation of a Cabinet-
level position to address climate change, which echoes gov-
ernmental reorganizations taken in the late 1950s. One action 
that is especially comparable and noteworthy is the funding of 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy ("ARPA-E") 
with four hundred million dollars from the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act ("ARRA") stimulus package. ARPA-
E's name and mission deliberately echo that of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency ("ARPA") 159 created after Sputnik in 
the Department of Defense. 
The moon landing was the product of an amalgamation of 
many disparate efforts to develop different types of technologies. 
So too is energy research and development. Like the Apollo pro-
gram, it is not clear at the outset which technology will prevail, 
so we need to work on a variety of fronts over a long period of 
time. Programs established in the stimulus package are tempo-
rary, not the comprehensive approach we need. 160 
Much of our effort to develop greentech is mired in a rut. No 
climate bill, renewable electricity standard, or national feed-in 
tariff is forthcoming. 161 Progress toward a stand-alone national 
renewable electricity standard is doubtful. 162 Many have noted 
the failure of federal Jeadership 163 and the actions of progres-
sive states that have stepped into the void with their own pro-
grams.164 These policies are not uniform throughout the country. 
A national program may achieve results that piecemeal state and 
regional efforts underway cannot.1 65 
How can we make more progress? Addressing climate 
change requires the kind of committed and strong support from 
the federal government that the space program received through-
out the 1960s. 166 The race is really to meet a national goal that 
we have articulated and that is in our national self-interest, 
whether or not it has geopolitical significance. We put a man 
on the moon in part because we were captivated by the idea of a 
simple, clear goal. I have focused on one idea that could catalyze 
a push toward rapidly increasing development of renewables: a 
"solar utility" that would reduce the upfront cost of panels to 
nearly zero by subsidizing and installing them at houses. 167 
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Conclusion 
China has become a major player in greentech in a short 
amount of time. If it could keep up its breakneck pace of 
growth it might look like it has pulled far ahead of us in the new 
"green energy race," but at present the picture is more muddled. 
The "space race" metaphor and the USTR investigation are 
counterproductive in that they pit the two nations against each 
other, when they should emphasize interdependence and coopera-
tion. In the end, competing with China in greentech is about as 
useful as "energy independence." It may be much more produc-
tive to convince Americans that their nation's future depends on 
investment in renewables through a specific national goal. Cl 
Endnotes: China's Greentech Programs and the USTR Investigation 
1 See general~v Joel B. Eisen, China's Renewable Energv law: A Platfbrmfor 
Green leadership?, 35 WM. & MARY EIWTL. L. & PoL'Y REv. I (2010). 
2 Id. 
3 United States launches Section 301 lnvestigation into China "s Policies ,1ffect-
ing Trade and Investment in Green Technologies, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENIA-
TIVE (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/node/6223. A full discussion of this 
investigation under prevailing trade law is beyond the scope of this article. 
4 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Failure Is Not an Option, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 27, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/opinion/28friedman. 
html'?ref=thomaslfriedman (opening the column with "China is having a good 
week in America. Yes it is. I'd even suggest that there is some high-fiving going 
on in Beijing. I mean, wouldn't you if you saw America's Democratic and 
Republican leaders conspiring to ensure that America cedes the next great global 
industry-E.T., energy technology-to China?"). 
5 Friedman has written often in his column about the need for American energy 
policy to move forward expeditiously, frequently contrasting America's lack 
of progress unfavorably with China's policies. See Christina Larson, America's 
Unjimnded Fears of a Green-Tech Race with China, YALE ENv'r 360 (Feb. 8, 
20 I 0), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2238 (stating that "Fried-
man has used the bully pulpit of his influential New York Times column to 
warn that the United States is engaged in a global green-tech competition 
with China, whose potential dominance represents a 'new Sputnik"'). Fried-
man has written numerous columns in the first half of 20 I 0 alone that mention 
China's energy ascendancy. See. e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, We're Gonna 
Be Son)", N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/ 
opinion/25friedman.html'?ref=thomaslfriedman; Thomas L. Friedman, What 
7 Republicans Could Do, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes. 
com/20 I 0/07/21 /opinion/21 friedman.html?ref=thomaslfriedman (noting that 
"by 2012, China should pretty much own the clean-tech industry"); Thomas L. 
Friedman, No Fooling Mother Nature, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2010/05/05/opinion/05friedman.html?ref=thomaslfriedman; 
Friedman, supra note 4; Thomas L. Friedman, Glohal Weirding l5 Here, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17. 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20 I 0/02/17 /opinion/ I 7friedman. 
html?ref=thomaslfriedman ("China ... is investing heavily in clean-tech, 
efficiency and high-speed rail. It secs the future trends and is betting on them. 
Indeed, I suspect China is quietly laughing at us right now."). 
6 See inji·a notes I0-24 and accompanying text. 
7 Sewell Chan & Keith Bradsher, U.S. to Investigate China's Clean Energv 
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20I0/10/16/ 
business/I 6wind.html. Note this comment from Rep. Charles Schumer, however: 
"An investigation into China's illegal subsidies for its clean energy industry is 
overdue, but it's no substitute for dealing with China's currency manipulation." 
Id. 
8 See CAGWmedia, Chinese Professor, You TUBE (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=OTSQozWP-rM. 
9 Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a "Disn1ptive" Technology?: The 
Caseji>r Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & Pus. PoL 'y 53 (20 I 0). 
JO THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHo's WINNING THE CLEAN ENERGY RACE'?: 
GROWTH, COMPETITION AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE WORLD'S LARGEST ECONOMIES 7 
(20 I 0), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/ 
Global_ warming/G-20%20Report.pdf (containing a section titled "China Takes 
the Lead, While the U.S. Slips"). 
11 ls China Beating the U.S. in Green Technology Development?, BUILDAROO. 
COM (Mar. 7, 20 I 0), http://buildaroo.com/news/article/china-green-technology-
development. 
12 See e.g .• Keith Bradsher, On Clean Energv. China Skirts Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 20 IO. http://www.nytimes.com/20 I 0/09/09/business/global/09trade. 
WINTER 20// 
html?pagewanted= 1 &_r= I &ref=keith_bradsher; Keith Bradsher, China lead-
ing Glohal Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, http://www. 
nytimes.com/20 I 0/0 I /31 /business/energy-environment/31 renew.html; Kent Gar-
ber, U.S. Lack5 a Coherent Clean Energv Strategy: China l5 the Main Competi-
tor in the Global Energy Race, U.S. NEWS & WoRJ.D REr., May 7, 2010, http:// 
politics. usnews.com/news/energy I articles/20 I 0105107 /us-lacks-a-coherent-clean-
energy-strategy .html; Evan Osnos, letter.from China: Green-Tech Space Race, 
NEw YoRKER, Apr. 21, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanos-
nos/2009/04/greentech-space-race.html; Bruce Usher, Red China, Green China, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/opinion/07Usher. 
html (observing that "[b ]y giving China more time to develop its capacity while 
neglecting our own. America is not just losing the clean-tech race, it's forfeiting 
it"); Gerard Wynn, ls Clean Tech China's Moon Shot'!, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 20 I 0, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60R02520100128; supra note 5 and 
accompanying text (including Thomas Friedman's New York Times columns). 
13 Richard Brubaker, Will China Surpass the US as a Superpower?, ALL 
ROADS LEAD TO CmNA (Jul. 16, 2010, 6:22), http://www.allroadsleadtochina. 
com/20 I 0/07 /16/will-china-surpass-the-us-as-a-superpower; Derek Thompson, ls 
China Winning the Energy Race?, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 17, 2010, 2:25 PM), http:// 
www .theatlantic.com/business/archive/20 I 0/06/is-china-winning-the-energy-
race/58321. republished by Julian L. Wong, Interview with The Atlantic on China 
and the Clean Energy Race, GREEN LEAP FORWARD (Jul. 8, 2010), http://green-
leapforward.com/201 0/07 /08/interview-with-the-atlantic-on-china-and-the-clean-
energy-race. 
14 Rep. Ed Markey, landing a Clean Energy Victory, HUFFINGTON Posr (Jul. 20, 
2009, 9:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-ed-markey/landing-a-clean-
energy-vi_b_240938.html. 
15 Frances Beineckc, Jn the Clean Energy Race. Jobs Can Stay in America, 
SWITCHBOARD: NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Feb. 23, 2010), http:// 
switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/fbeinecke/in_the_clean_energy_race_with.html 
(providing commentary by Frances Beinecke, President of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council); Robert F. Kennedy, Jr .. The New Anns Race, HurnNGTON PosT 
(Nov. 19, 2009, 3:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-f-kennedy-jr/ 
the-new-arms-race_b_364211.html. 
16 Daniel J. Weiss & Susan Lyon, Running/or First in the Clean-Energy Race, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/20 I 0/0 I /sotu_energy.html. The Center's "Out of the Running" report, as 
discussed below, analyzes the race in detail. Ros ATKINSON ET AL.. BREAKTHROUGH 
INST. & TilE INFO. TEC!I. & INNOVATION FOUND., RISING TIGERS SLEEPING GIANT: 
A'ilAN NATIONS SET TO DOMINATE THE CLEAN ENERGY RACE BV Our-INVESTING THE 
UNITED Sr ATES (2009), http://thebreakthrough.org/blog!Rising_ Tigers.pdf; Van 
Jones & Pan Jiahua, Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Climate Change, Innovation 
and the Clean Energy Race, Gov MONITOR (May 23, 2010), http://www.the-
govmonitor.com/world_news/britain/climatc-change-innovation-and-the-clean-
energy-race-31528.html. 
17 John Doerr & Jeff lmmelt, Falling Behind On Green Tech, WASH. Posr, Aug. 
3, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/02/ 
AR2009080201563.html (providing commentary by John Doerr, partner in the 
venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, and by Jefflmmelt, chair-
man and chief executive of General Electric, a major manufacturer of wind tur-
bine equipment). 
18 Eric Pooley, Senate Inaction Cedes U.S. Energy Race to China, BLOOMBERG, 
Jul. 29, 20 I 0, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/senate-inaction-
cedes-u-s-energy-race-to-china-commentary-by-eric-pooley.html; Kerri Shannon, 
Endnotes: China's Greentech Programs and the USTR Investigation 
continued on page 70 
8 
